March 19, 2011
A few weeks before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, an exiled Afghan leader I had known for nearly 20 years paid a visit to my home in Lahore. His name was Hamid Karzai, and his problem, he told me, was that he was rapidly losing faith in the West’s concern for his country.
Karzai was the scion of a prominent Pashtun family in southern Afghanistan, one with a deep-rooted enmity for the Taliban regime. The Taliban, which had ruled the country since 1996, had gunned down Karzai’s father in front of a mosque in the Pakistani city of Quetta two years earlier. Now the younger Karzai was clandestinely sending money and weapons across the Afghan border for an eventual uprising against the ruling regime. But he had just been served notice by Pakistan’s all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) that his visa had been revoked — the Taliban, with its close links to the Pakistani intelligence agency, had urged the ISI to get rid of him. Karzai was making the rounds of Western embassies in Islamabad to ask whether anyone would support him if he went inside the country and raised the standard of rebellion. But nobody offered to help. Several ambassadors refused to see him.
By the time U.S. bombers pounded the last remnants of the Taliban out of Kabul just a few months later, everything had changed. Karzai had gone from pariah to president and, in the eyes of the U.S. government, from combatant in an obscure regional conflict to vital strategic partner. Yet when I met with Karzai not long ago at the presidential palace in Kabul for a lengthy conversation, one of many in the decade since our pre-9/11 meeting in Lahore, it was remarkable how much his relationship with the United States seemed to have come full circle.
Once again, Karzai now appears mistrusting of the West’s long-term commitment to his country. He considers the Americans to be hopelessly fickle, represented by multiple military and civilian envoys who carry contradictory messages, work at cross-purposes, and wage their Washington turf battles in his drawing room, at his expense, while operating on short fuses and even shorter timetables. “In the time an American wants Karzai to act, the president is still cooling his cup of tea,” one of his advisors complained to me.
Over the course of the last decade, the few U.S. officials whom Karzai trusted have one by one moved on, leaving the Afghan president alone with his conspiracy theories. Of late, he is convinced that the Americans want to get rid of him, even as he stubbornly refuses to reckon with the aspects of his rule that might make them wish to do so: his own administrative failures, growing corruption in the top ranks of his government and family, the rigged presidential election that won him a second term, and above all his failure to articulate a vision for the future of his country. Last fall he reportedly told top U.S. officials that of the three “main enemies” he faced — the United States, the international community, and the Taliban — he would side first with the Taliban.
Ironically, 2010 was supposed to be a new “year one” for the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, when the Americans, after years of neglecting the country in favor of Iraq, finally invested the resources necessary to defeat the Taliban and rebuild the country. Instead, things got worse. Last year saw the highest death toll of U.S.-led coalition forces since the beginning of the war, increasing civilian casualties, and the spread of the Taliban insurgency, once contained in south and east Afghanistan, into the north and west as well.
At the heart of the failure, both a cause and consequence of it, is the tattered U.S. relationship with Karzai, an alliance that has cost the United States more than $330 billion and nearly 1,400 soldiers’ lives, but is now at the lowest ebb of its nearly decade-long history. U.S. President Barack Obama and his administration plainly do not trust the Afghan leader, or even much like him. Apparently convinced that cleaning up the Afghan government is more important to the country’s stability than Karzai himself, U.S. authorities have mounted increasingly confrontational anti-corruption investigations of his inner circle…
At least two employees of the Council on Foundations, an organization of 1,750 grant makers, allegedly defrauded the group of an estimated $200,000 in a scheme that went on for two years, the organization said in a letter posted on its Web site today.
The council says that the employees, who worked in the organization’s technology department, used the group’s money to buy computers that they then resold for personal gain.
The council’s accounting department became suspicious in December after finding invoices for computers the organization was not using, said Janne Gallagher, the group’s senior vice president and general counsel. The organization brought in outside counsel and investigators to look into the matter. None of the employees involved in the alleged fraud now work there.
Ms. Gallagher said the council had alerted the Arlington County Police Department of the fraud and would be turning over the results of its investigation to the police department for prosecution.
She said she could not name the employees or specify how many people were involved other than confirming that more than one employee was involved. “We don’t want to jeopardize any law-enforcement actions that might be taken,” she said.
Stepping Up Inventories
Steve Gunderson, the council’s president, was traveling and could not be reached for comment.
In his letter to members of the council, he said the organization was taking steps to ensure that fraud couldn’t happen again. In 2009 the counsel laid off 16 percent of its employees because of the bad economy, and the letter said having a smaller staff meant that some practices had slipped through the cracks…
March 19, 2011
This image has been posted with express written permission. This cartoon was originally published at Town Hall.