Back to Basics: Israel’s Arab Minority and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

March 16, 2012

ICG:

World attention remains fixed on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but a distinct, albeit related, conflict smoulders within Israel itself. It might be no less perilous. Jewish-Arab domestic relations have deteriorated steadily for a decade. More and more, the Jewish majority views the Palestinian minority as subversive, disloyal and – due to its birth rates – a demographic threat. Palestinian citizens are politically marginalised, economically underprivileged, ever more unwilling to accept systemic inequality and ever more willing to confront the status quo. Interaction with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict further complicates matters as negotiations bump against a core issue – whether Palestinians will recognise Israel’s Jewish character – that further inflames communal relations. There is no easy or quick fix. In the near term, Israel should take practical steps to defuse tensions with its Arab minority and integrate it into the civic order. In the longer run, the challenge to Israeli Jews and the Palestinian national movement is to come to terms with the most basic questions: what is the character of the state of Israel, and what rights should its Arab citizens enjoy?

For over six decades, Israel’s Palestinian citizens have had a unique experience: they are a Palestinian national minority in a Jewish state locked in conflict with its Arab neighbours but they also constitute an Israeli minority enjoying the benefits of citizenship in a state that prizes democracy. This has translated into ambivalent relations with both the state of Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and beyond. They feel solidarity with their brethren elsewhere, yet many Arabs study in Israeli universities, work side-by-side with Jews and speak Hebrew fluently – a degree of familiarity that has only made the discrimination and alienation from which they suffer seem more acute and demands for equality more insistent.

Since 2000, a series of dramatic events have both poisoned Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and reinvigorated its Palestinian minority. The collapse of the peace process and ensuing intifada harmed Israel’s relations with not only Palestinians in the occupied territories but also its own Palestinian minority. As Palestinians in Israel organised rallies in solidarity with Gazans and West Bankers, Israeli Jews grew ever more suspicious of their loyalty. Palestinian citizens’ trust in the state plummeted after Israeli security forces killed thirteen of their own during protests in October 2000. A rapid succession of confrontations – the 2006 war in Lebanon; 2008-2009 Gaza war; and 2010 bloody Israeli raid on the aid flotilla to Gaza – further deepened mistrust, galvanising the perception among Israeli Jews that Palestinian citizens had embraced their sworn adversaries. Among Arabs, it reinforced the sense that they had no place in Israel. Several have been arrested on charges of abetting terrorist activity. Meanwhile, the crisis of the Palestinian national movement – divided, adrift and in search of a new strategy – has opened up political space for Israel’s Arab minority.

As a consequence, Palestinian citizens began to look outside – to surrounding Arab states and the wider international community – for moral sustenance and political leverage. They have come to emphasise their Palestinian identity and increasingly dissociate themselves from formal Israeli politics. The result has been steadily declining Arab turnout for national elections and, among those who still bother to vote, a shift from Jewish Zionist to Arab parties. Palestinians invest more energy in political activity taking place beyond the reach of official institutions. Unsurprisingly, Sheikh Raed Salah – the leader of the northernbranch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, which refuses to engage with the country’s political institutions – has become the highest-profile Arab politician.

Yet Palestinian citizens’ conflicting experiences has meant that such reactions go hand-in-hand with others: continual demands for achieving their rights withinIsrael; persistent criticism of Israel’s democratic shortcomings; and the absence of any visible interest or willingness to relocate to an eventual Palestinian state. They undoubtedly feel deeply Palestinian. But they also take their Israeli citizenship seriously.

Simultaneous Arab marginalisation and revitalisation also has manifested itself in initial efforts by its leadership to define the community’s political aspirations. The so-called “Vision Documents” advocate full Jewish-Arab equality, adamantly reject the notion of a Jewish state and call instead for a “binational state” – in essence, challenging Israel’s current self-definition. This, for many Jews, is tantamount to a declaration of war.

For its part, Israel’s Jewish majority – confronted by an internal minority developing alliances outside the state and seeming to display solidarity with its foes – has grown ever more suspicious of a community it views as a potential fifth column. It has shunned Palestinians, enacted legislation to strengthen the state’s Jewish identity and sought to ban certain Arab parties and parliamentarians. Today, what for most Palestinian citizens is a principled struggle for equal rights is perceived by many Israeli Jews as a dangerous denial of Jewish nationhood. What for most Jews is akin to complicity with their enemies is viewed by Palestinian citizens as an expression of affinity for their brethren.

This is taking place against the backdrop of a peace process in which very little is happening – and what is happening only makes matters worse. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) accept Israel as a Jewish nation-state in the context of a final status agreement. That request resonates widely with Israel’s Jews, but raises all sorts of red flags for its Palestinian citizens, who have vigorously pressed the PLO to reject it. They might not have a veto, yet President Mahmoud Abbas cannot easily dismiss their views on such matters and has shown no inclination to do so. All of which has only elevated the centrality of the demand, making it all the more important for Israel’s government and all the more unacceptable to its Palestinian minority.

Add to this the idea, floated by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s party, of “populated land swaps” – under which certain Arab-majority areas of Israel would be swapped for some of the so-called West Bank settlement blocks. Alarmed that they could twice pay the price for a two-state settlement – through acquiescence in their state’s “Jewishness” and through forcible loss of their citizenship – Israel’s Palestinian minority is making it ever clearer that peace deal or no peace deal, there will be no end to Palestinian claims until their demands also are met. To which Israel’s response is: Why pay the hefty price of an agreement with the PLO if it leaves behind an open wound right in our heart?

It was not meant to be so. Originally, the notion was that progress in the peace process would help improve Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. Instead, simultaneous deterioration on both fronts has turned a presumably virtuous circle into a dreadfully vicious one. Neither the State of Israel nor its Arab minority will be willing to reach a historic understanding before the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been settled; and settling that conflict will be near-impossible without addressing the question of Israel’s nature – which itself cannot be done without the acquiescence of Israel’s Arab citizens…

Read it all.

About these ads

6 Responses to “Back to Basics: Israel’s Arab Minority and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”


  1. “Jewish-Arab domestic relations have deteriorated steadily for a decade” – when have they ever been good? Even before the founding of the State of Israel, Arabs have attacked Israelis that were living in small communities in Israel.

    • Booger Says:

      I think the article is referring to the cold peace that was negotiated during the Carter Administration. However, I agree, the whole thing was a farce.

      It was predicated upon Israel and the Palestinians negotiating in good faith to effect a peace settlement. However, that negotiation was doomed from the start. The farce reached a crescendo in the infamous negotiations that took place during the Clinton Administration, where the Israelis offered everything, including Jerusalem on the Pre-1967 borders, and was turned down by Yassir Arafat.

      It is doubtful that the Palestinians are capable of settling for anything less than the entire territory of Israel. That inflexibility is the key to their suffering.

  2. Morton Nadler Says:

    “Negotiations?” It was Prime Minister Shamir who, on leaving office in 1992 declared that he could talk for ten years and in that time israel would have another half million settlers. Likud’s current platform [on the Knesset website] states that (1) Israel will never recognize a Palestinian state west of the Jordan and (2) the Jordan is the eastern border of Israel.

    “Farce?” Yes. But who is the farceur?

    • SC&A Says:

      Absurd.

      The Palestinians for decades had declared they would not only never recognize Israel, they promised her destruction- and accompanying genocide as well.

      Hamas still assumes that position.

    • Booger Says:

      Clearly you’re ignoring the points I have cited, and you’re citing entirely different facts that have little bearing on the situation. I would argue with you further, but we’re talking past each other.

      • SC&A Says:

        Facts are anathema to anyone for the narrative must take precedence.

        Resolution is never easy. That said, acknowledgement of facts is a beginning.

        I don’t blame the Palestinians, per se. They have been victimized by their own leadership and those for whom continued conflict diverted attention away from their own dysfunction. The Palestinians are and have been pawns or a very long time.

        That doesn’t excuse or mitigate staqte sponsored bigotry, racism and hate. It does however explain it and in doing so prescribes how we ought to help them out of the morass they are in.


Comments are closed.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 81 other followers

%d bloggers like this: